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UNBORN COMMUNITIES 
Gregory S. Alexander 
 
 Do property owners owe obligations to members of future generations? Although the 
question can be reframed in rights-terms so that it faces rights-oriented theories of property, it 
seems to pose a greater challenge to those theories of property that directly focus on the 
obligations that property owners owe to others rather than (or, better, along with the rights of 
owner). The challenge is compounded where such theories emphasize the relationships between  
individual property owners and the various communities to which they belong. Do those 
communities include members of future generations? This paper addresses these questions as 
they apply to a property theory that I have developed in recent work, a theory that we can call the 
human-flourishing theory of property.1 
 
 The conclusion drawn here is that property owners do indeed owe moral obligations to 
future generations. But the scope of those obligations is restricted, certainly more so than some 
theorists, such as Jeremy Waldron, have claimed.2 Unlike Waldron, for whom such obligations 
are a matter of rights, I argue that the obligations that property owners owe to past generations 
are grounded on dependence. Specifically, I argue that if we expect fellow members of our 
communities in future generations to continue what I call the life-transcending projects that we 
began, then it is incumbent on us to provide that same background conditions that we enjoyed to 
those future generation community members to whom we transfer the responsibility of 
continuing or fulfilling our life-transcending projects. Moreover, as the distance between the 
living and the unborn increases, our obligations to future generational communities generally 
weaken. Our obligations to them are limited to the background conditions that enable them to 
continue the life-transcending projects transferred to them. These conclusions place me in an 
intermediate position between those who take a robust view of the obligations that the living owe 
to future generations3 and those who think that the living owe no such obligations at all.4 
 
I. THE HUMAN-FLOURISHING THEORY OF PROPERTY: AN OVERVIEW 
 
                                                            
 A. Robert Noll Professor of Law, Cornell University. I am indebted to participants in the Eighth Annual 
International Human Rights Conference of the Academic Center of Law and Business, held in Tel Aviv, Israel, in 
January 2013, for comments on an earlier draft of this paper, and to the organizers for inviting me. I am especially 
indebted to my friend Hanoch Dagan for his usual trenchant criticisms and helpful comments. The numerous errors 
that doubtless remain are all mine. 
1 See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745 
(2009); Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. Peñalver, Properties of Community, 10 THEOR. INQUIRIES IN L. 127 
(2009). 
2 See JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 115-17, 423, 425-27, 430-39, 444-45 (1988) 
(developing a general-rights theory of property with broadly distributive implications). 
3 See, e.g., id.; JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES §44 (Cambridge, MA, 1999). 
4 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Justice across the Generations, in Peter Laslett and James S. Fishkin eds., JUSTICE 
BETWEEN AGE GROUPS AND GENERATIONS 84 (New Haven, CT, 1992) Richard de George,  The Environment, 
Rights, and Future Generations, in Ernest Partridge, ed., RESPONSIBILITIES TO FUTURE GENERATIONS: 
ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 157 (Buffalo, NY, 1981). 
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 The fundamental normative premise of this paper is that the moral foundation of property 
is human flourishing. By human flourishing, I mean that a person has the opportunity to live a 
life as fulfilling as possible for him or her.5  
 
 There are two key characteristics of my conception of human flourishing. First, it is 
morally pluralistic; that is, it rejects the notion that there exists a single irreducible fundamental 
moral value to which all other moral values may be reduced. Rather, it conceives of human 
flourishing as including (but not limited to) ― individual autonomy, personal security/privacy, 
personhood, self-determination, community, and equality. These values cannot be reduced to a 
single basic value because they are incommensurable; that is, there is no available metric by 
which one can commensurate goods such as equality and personhood. (It’s like saying that 
Einstein’s genius was “better than” Mother Theresa’s compassion ─ the comparison makes no 
sense.) They are all aspect of human flourishing, and cannot be balanced one against the other.  
 The second defining characteristic of flourishing is that it is objective. This is why 
flourishing is a better translation of eudaimonia than happiness is. The problem with “happiness” 
is that it connotes something which is subjectively determined. It is for me, not for you, to 
pronounce on whether I am happy, or on whether my life, as a whole, has been a happy one. 
Contrast my being healthy or flourishing. Here we have no difficulty in recognizing that I might 
think I was healthy, either physically or psychologically, or think that I was flourishing and just 
be plain wrong. It is all too easy for me to be mistaken about whether my life is eudaimon (the 
adjective from eudaimonia) not simply because it is easy to deceive oneself, but because it is 
easy to have a mistaken conception of eudaimonia, or of what it is to live well as a human being, 
believing it to consist largely in physical pleasure or luxury for example.  
 My account of human flourishing stresses two necessary conditions. First, following 
Amartya Sen,6 I argue that human beings must develop certain capabilities necessary for a well 
lived, and distinctly human life. Among these necessary capabilities are health, the ability to 
engage in practical reasoning, freedom to make deliberate choices, and the ability to get along 
with other people (sociability). The second necessary condition for human flourishing is a social 
context. Flourishing occurs only in society with, indeed, dependent upon, other human beings.  
Living within webs of social relationships is a necessary condition for humans to develop the 
distinctively human capacities that allow us to flourish.   
 These two characteristics of human flourishing, developing necessary capabilities and 
dependency on others, are deeply interconnected.  We are not born as autonomous agents; we 
learn it. And we do not develop autonomy by ourselves or through our own devices; we develop 
autonomy through the help of others. We are, in short, inevitably dependent upon various 
                                                            
5 My use of the term “human flourishing is Aristotelian. Aristotle’s term, of course, was eudaimonia, which is 
commonly translated as “happiness.” Human flourishing is a better translation of eudaimonia, however, for reasons 
explained further in the paper.  
6 See, e.g., AMARTYA SEN, COMMODITIES AND CAPABILITIES (New Delhi, 1999); AMARTYA SEN, FREEDOM AS 
DEVELOPMENT (New York, 1999). 
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communities, both chosen and unchosen, not only for our physical survival, but also for our 
ability to function as free and rational agents. 
Communities, including but not limited to the state, are the mediating vehicles through 
which we come to acquire the resources we need to flourish and to become fully socialized into 
the exercise of our capabilities.7  Even (or more properly, precisely) as free, rational persons, we 
never cease to operate within and depend upon the matrices of the many communities in which 
we find ourselves in association.  Each of our identities is inextricably connected in some sense 
to others with whom we are connected as members of one or typically more communities.  Our 
identities are literally constituted by the communities of which we are members.  Asked who we 
are, we inevitably talk about the communities where we were born and raised, our nation, our 
family, where we attended school, our friends, our religious communities and clubs.  Indeed, 
individuals and communities interpenetrate one another so completely that they can never be 
fully separated.8 
 
The communities in which we find ourselves play crucial roles in the formation of our 
preferences, the extent of our expectations, and the scope of our aspirations.  The homeless 
person, accustomed to receiving little more than abuse or neglect, may come to expect little more 
out of life.9  Similarly, although membership in certain communities can obviously be based 
upon contract or voluntary agreement, the very possibility of these voluntarily associative 
relationships depends upon our prior and continuing (and typically involuntary) participation in 
or exposure to communal institutions.  These institutions impart to us the information and 
capacities that give us the tools needed to permit us to understand and engage in voluntary 
choosing at all.10 
 
Precisely because capabilities are essential to flourishing in a distinctively human way, 
development of one’s capabilities is an objective human good, something that we ought (insofar 
as we accept these particular capabilities as intrinsically valuable) to promote as a good in and of 
itself.  As a matter of human dignity, every person is equally entitled to flourish.  This being so, 
every person must be equally entitled to those things essential for human flourishing, i.e., the 
capabilities that are the foundation of flourishing and the material resources required to nurture 
those capabilities.  In the absence of these capabilities and supporting resources, recognition of 
the entitlement to flourish is simply an empty gesture.  But not every society will be equally 
conducive to human flourishing.  The cultivation of the capabilities necessary for flourishing 
depends upon social matrices, and the condition of those matrices varies among societies, 
sometimes quite widely.  A society that fosters those capabilities that are necessary for human 
flourishing is morally better than one that is either indifferent or (even worse) hostile to their 
                                                            
 7 The conception of community which underlays my approach to the social-obligation norm owes much to the 
following works: ROBERT BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART, 2d ed. (New York, 1996); ROSALIND 
HURSTHOUSE, ON VIRTUE ETHICS (Oxford 1999); ALASTAIR MACINTYRE, DEPENDENT RATIONAL ANIMALS: WHY 
HUMAN BEINGS NEED THE VIRTUES (Chicago 1999); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE, 
2d ed. (Cambridge 1998); CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY  
(Cambridge, Ma, 1989). 
 8 For an elaboration of this idea, see Gregory S. Alexander, Dilemmas of Group Autonomy: Residential 
Associations and Community, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 21–28 (1989). 
 9 See SEN, COMMODITIES AND CAPABILITIES, supra at 21 (“A person who is ill-fed, undernourished, 
unsheltered and ill can still be high up in the scale of happiness or desire-fulfillment if he or she has learned to have 
‘realistic’ desires and to take pleasure in small mercies.”). 
 10 See TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF, supra at 196–98; Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property 
Law, supra passim. 
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manifestation. 
 
Human flourishing requires not only virtues, but also resources.  Each of us desires 
resources to enable development of the capabilities that are essential for human beings.  Being 
social animals, moreover, humans want those resources not only for themselves but also for 
others so that they develop the capabilities for flourishing as well.11  Hence, human flourishing 
requires distributive justice, the ultimate objective of which is to give people what they need in 
order to develop the capabilities necessary for living the well-lived life (though not necessarily 
what they want).12 
 
If human capacities such as health, the ability to engage in practical reasoning, and to make 
reasoned decisions about how to live our lives are components of the well-lived life, then surely 
we are all obligated to support and nurture the social structures without which those human 
capabilities cannot be developed.13  Consequently, from the standpoint of the capabilities 
necessary for human flourishing, how we participate in political and social communities cannot 
just be an expression of our preexisting autonomy; our participation cannot be solely a volitional 
act we commit for instrumental reasons such as preference satisfaction.  Our participation in 
community is also an objectively grounded obligation rooted in our recognition of the value of 
the capabilities that are necessary for the well-lived life.   
 
Acknowledgment of our human dependence upon others and upon the social matrices that 
nurture the capacities that enable us to flourish creates for us a moral obligation to support these 
matrices.  The major claim here, in short, is that our (and others’) dependence creates, for us (and 
for them), an obligation to participate in and support the social networks and structures that 
enable us to develop those human capabilities that make human flourishing possible.   
 
II. THE MEANINGS OF COMMUNITY 
 
  The term “community” can be used to refer to a concept,14 a regulative ideal,15 or a social 
institution or practice, but all too frequently scholars do not make clear in which sense they are 
                                                            
 11 See JAMES GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS OF PRIVATE LAW: PROPERTY, TORT, CONTRACT, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
(New York, 2006), p.  8. 
 12 As Gordley points out, the Aristotelian concept of human flourishing also rests on commutative justice, the 
object of which is to enable each person to obtain what she needs for the development of the essential capabilities 
without unfairly inhibiting others’ abilities to do the same.  See id. 
 13 Id. at 197. 
14 Referring to community as a concept, Andrew Mason has usefully distinguished between “ordinary” community 
and “moralized” community. See ANDREW MASON, COMMUNITY, SOLIDARITY, AND BELONGING: LEVELS OF 
BELONGING AND THEIR NORMATIVE SIGNIFICANCE (Cambridge 2000), pp. 21–27. By “ordinary” community, Mason 
means a group who act or cooperate together in pursuit of shared goals or at least who possess common interests. 
Id., 21. A “moralized” community has two additional conditions: (1) solidarity, or mutual concern, i.e., its members 
must give each other’s interests some degree of non-instrumental weight, and (2) no systematic exploitation among 
members. Id., 27.  
15 As a regulative or normative ideal, theorists like Michael Sandel have used the term as an alternative to the 
political and moral vision of “atomist” individualists, whose central doctrine is, as Charles Taylor explains, “a 
principle ascribing rights to men as binding unconditionally . . . [b]ut . . . do[es] not accept as similarly 
unconditional a principle of belonging or obligation.” CHARLES TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS: PHILOSOPHY AND 
THE HUMAN SCIENCES, vol. 2 (Cambridge 1985), 188. Arguing against the primacy of rights, communitarians like 
Taylor have propounded what he calls a “social thesis,” which holds that the very affirmative of our right creates for 
 5 
 
using the term. In the context of property theory, community is more commonly used to refer to 
social institutions and practices.16 As a social institution, community exhibits a remarkable 
diversity of forms, covering a wide spectrum of practices.17 Even if we confine the term 
“communities” to territorial communities, it remains maddeningly ambiguous. Its use ranges 
from small face-to-face groups in which personal relationships are close and characterized by a 
high degree of mutuality and identification to the so-called “global community.” Part of the 
difficulty stems from the famous distinction drawn by Ferdinand Tönnies between Gemeinschaft 
and Gesellschaft,18 the former referring to small-scale, pre-industrial groups whose social 
relations are intimate, while the latter refers to the contractual and impersonal relationships 
typical of industrial societies. Although most social scientists today regard that distinction as 
unhelpful, it continues to influence some discussions of community by a tendency to 
dichotomize conceptions of community as either hopelessly weak or “tightly knit,” with the latter 
often romanticized as the ideal toward which communities ought to aspire.  
 
  For present purposes, what matters is to understand that individual volition plays only a 
limited role in the context of communities, as social institutions. Membership in communities 
may be non-volitional as well as volitional. Moreover, communities play crucial roles in the 
formation of our preferences, the extent of our expectations, and the scope of our aspirations. 
Indeed, the very possibility of communities being based on private, individual choice depends 
upon our prior and continuing (and frequently involuntary) participation in or exposure to 
communal institutions that impart to us the information, resources, and capacities necessary to 
understand and engage in voluntary choice to begin with.  
 
 Non-volitional communities are non-strategic in character. This means that their 
members do not join them or remain in them for individual strategic advantages. Indeed, 
members of some non-volitional communities sometimes find their membership disadvantageous 
in some personal, but very real sense. For example, family members may experience 
membership in their families threatening to their personal identities in some way and try to deny 
membership from the family or escape from it.  
 
 The non-strategic and non-contractual character of many communities means that social 
relations within them will transcend demands for immediate or short-term reciprocity. It further 
means that members of such communities, which include but are not limited to political 
communities, have obligations to fellow members of their communities. These obligations result 
from membership itself. What members give to fellow community members are not in the nature 
of market exchanges, where a calculated return of greater value is expected. There may well be 
an expectation of reciprocity, but, as Hanoch Dagan notes,19 the expectation may well operate 
over an extended period of time, perhaps even extending over multiple life-times. Moreover, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
us an obligation to belong to and sustain the right kind of society, i.e., the kind of society that nurtures people’s 
capabilities to develop as free and autonomous moral agents. 
16 See, e.g., Amnon Lehavi, How Property Can Create, Maintain, or Destroy Community,   THEORETICAL INQUIRIES 
IN LAW (2009) 
17 See ibid. 
18 FERDINAND TÖNNIES, COMMUNITY AND CIVIL SOCIETY, Jose Harris ed. (Cambridge 2001). 
19 See Hanoch Dagan, Taking and Distributive Justice, 85 VA. L. REV. 741 (1999); Hanoch Dagan, Just 
Compensation, Incentives, and Social Meanings, 99 MICH. L. REV. 134 (2000). 
 6 
 
form that such long-term reciprocity takes means that compensation may be very different in 
kind from what was given. Indeed, it may come from a member of the community other than the 
one to whom it was given, and, in some ways, its “value” relative to the original contribution is 
less important than that it is received at all.20   
 
III. ARE THERE INTERGENERATIONAL COMMUNITIES? 
 
 The idea that there are communities that cross generational boundaries has been widely 
contested. Without reviewing all of the objections and questions that theorists have raised 
regarding this concept, we must at least consider some of these doubts. For example, given that 
individuals do not regularly interact with members of future generations, how are 
intergenerational communities even possible? Second, how can such communities be said to 
exist when some individuals do not identify with any generation other than their own? Third, if 
communities are constitutive of individual identities insofar as its members share notions of the 
good or at least participate in open debates about shared goods, how are transgenerational 
constitutive communities possible where members of future generations do not directly 
participate in such debates? 
 
 The first problem is familiar in the literature on intergenerational justice. The notion of 
intergenerational communities seems implausible given the fact that members of the present 
generation do not interact with future generations.21 In the absence of such interaction, there is 
no reciprocity between present and future generations.22 There must be, one scholar argues, “an 
exchange of ideas and conceptions of purposes that must be available to persons before they can 
be considered to stand as joint participants in a common project.”23 
 
 This objection trades on a narrow conception of interaction. It supposes that social 
interaction must be face-to-face, direct, or synchronic. But interactions among groups often are 
diachronic. The transmission of cultural memories, shared political histories and traditions,24 for 
example, are diachronic, yet are forms of group interaction. In the process of such transmissions, 
past generations speak, as it were, to the present and future generations. Those generations, in 
turn, speak back to the past by interpreting these histories and traditions from their own point of 
view. What results is a hermeneutic conversation that is certainly an “exchange of ideas and 
conceptions of purposes.” Indeed, this hermeneutic intergenerational conversation is sometimes 
more robust than that among generational contemporaries.  
 
 Related to the question of interaction is another objection that is sometimes raised. 
Because present and future people are not positioned so as to be able to reciprocate with each 
other, they cannot develop a sense of identity with each other, a feeling of being on the same 
                                                            
20 See Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, supra at 770-771. 
21 See, e.g., Ernest Partridge, Future Generations, in A COMPANION TO ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS, Dale Jamieson ed. 
(Malden, MA, 2001). 
22 See Norman S. Care, Future Generations, Public Policy and the Motivation Problem, 4 ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 
195 (1982). 
23 Id. at 208. 
24 In the U.S., for example, a clear example is the history and tradition of the U.S. Constitution, a cultural memory 
that has been the subject of extraordinarily lively debates.   
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side.25 This objection fails to take account of the multiple ways in which people can and do 
identify with each other. It is not fruitful to ask whether members of one group identify in the 
abstract with members of another group. The more helpful question is whether there is some 
specific level or respect in which members of the different groups identify with each other. For 
example, as a practicing Roman Catholic, I identify with Catholics around the world on the 
various issues that concern the Church despite the fact that I am not in a position to reciprocate 
with many of them. Identification for purposes of community existence does not require 
complete or 100 percent identity of interests or views. Such a requirement would disqualify 
many groups that otherwise plainly are communities, including families. What is required is that 
members of the two groups experience a sense of common membership with respect to some 
value that is important to them both. 
 
 A third objection concerns shared purposes. Presumably, members of communities hold 
shared purposes or norms. Such sharing is indispensable to the existence of communities because 
of their constitutive nature. According to this constitutive conception of communities,26 a 
“community [is] constitutive of the shared self-understandings of the participants and embodied 
in their institutional arrangements.”27 That is, what binds members of the community together is 
not sentiment but identity.28 Community members share understandings of whom and what they 
are, and these understandings are sufficiently fundamental that they constitute part of the 
members’ self-identities.  
 
 Avner de-Shalit refers to the experience of sharing that is necessary for constitutive 
communities by the term “moral similarity.”29 He distinguishes that term from cultural 
homogeneity which may characterize groups that may lack shared ideas or purposes.30 Nor does 
moral similarity require unanimity. Communities experiences debate about the ideas and norms 
they share, sometimes quite robustly. Old ideas may be reexamined; new one proposed and 
either adopted or rejected. As the community’s normative constitution shifts, some members may 
become disaffected, losing their moral similarity, and drop out. The shift may attract new 
member in turn. The point is that debate is very much a part of, indeed even necessary for, the 
experience of moral similarity.  
 
 If debate is necessary for the moral similarity that characterizes communities, how is such 
a debate possible between members of present and future generations? Here de-Shalit introduces 
another concept that is useful ─ cultural interaction. De-Shalit points out that every community 
has its own history of cultural interaction, which includes political, social, and cultural 
experiences that they share as well as shared traditions, symbols, practices, and codes.31 Cultural 
interaction is not confined within the same generation, of course, for children interact in various 
ways with their parents and grandparents about the meanings and even legitimacy of their 
                                                            
25 See Care, Future Generations, Public Policy and the Motivation Problem, supra, at 208-09. 
26 See MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (Cambridge, 1982); AVNER DE-SHALIT, WHY 
POSTERITY MATTERS: ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND FUTURE GENERATIONS (London, 1995). 
27 SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE, supra, at 173. 
28 See DE-SHALIT, WHY POSTERITY MATTERS, supra, at 33. 
29 Id. at 25-31 and passim.  
30 Id. at 27. 
31 Id. at 23.  
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traditions and beliefs. These interactions are face-to-face, but others are not. For example, 
religious communities whose shared traditions include historical texts read, interpret, reinterpret, 
and debate those texts over many generations, sometimes centuries, in an ongoing debate about 
the meaning and legitimacy of various textual meanings. These debates are between present and 
past generations as well as within single generations. This example is what Alastair MacIntyre 
has in mind when he writes 
 
 [L]iving tradition then is an historically extended, socially embodied argument, and an 
 argument precisely in part about the goods which constitute that tradition. Within a 
 tradition the pursuit of goods extends through generations, sometimes through many 
 generations.32 
 
The contested meaning and even legitimacy of the religious group’s core texts are the topics of 
an ongoing argument as to the religion’s very identity. In this respect, as MacIntyre points out, 
“Traditions . . . embody continuities of conflict.”33 
 
 These continuities are forward-looking as well as backward-looking. Cultural practices 
commonly speak to the future, even the distant future. When originators of core religious texts 
(or glosses upon those texts) write, they address not only their contemporaries but followers 
(including future converts) who will listen to their texts and reply, as it were, throughout the 
generations ahead. The conversation is not face-to-face, but it is very real nonetheless. It is as 
real as when an American citizen writes a letter to her President, knowing that there will be no 
reply. The letter writer does not think she is speaking to herself, for there is some possibility that 
her letter will influence the President in some well, however indirectly or slightly.  
 
 Future community members to whom the group’s cultural values, traditions, and 
practices are addressed receive the message. Their cultural and normative starting point is what 
they inherited from their forebears. But they are not merely passive receptors. They answer back 
by reviewing, critiquing, and sometimes revising the cultural traditions and normative material 
that they inherited. Revision is sometimes necessary because of changes in the community’s 
circumstances, economic, social, technological, or other types of changes.34 Eventually, the 
degree of moral similarity will diminish to the point that it is no longer meaningful to consider 
the intergenerational community as still existing. De-Shalit explains:  
 
 When it comes about that the values of the members of the community change 
 drastically, many members will find themselves in a state of growing alienation from the 
 community of their ancestors. This will continue until the question arises as to whether 
 they still regard it as the same transgenerational community, a community which defines 
 the “self” of its members. A time will come when it becomes questionable whether future 
 generations will still speak of the same transgenerational community.35 
 
                                                            
32 ALASTAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 222 (Notre Dame, IN, 1981). 
33 Ibid. 
34 See DE-SHALIT, WHY POSTERITY MATTERS, supra, at 46-49. 
35 Id. at 47. 
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Intergenerational constitutive communities, then, are both dynamic and contingent. They change, 
and their duration is limited, dependent as they are upon external factors that affect their 
members’ identification with them and their shared normative orientation.  
 
IV. CAN OBLIGATIONS EXIST WITHIN INTERGENERATIONAL COMMUNITIES?  
 
 The human flourishing theory grounds obligation on dependence. As we have seem, it 
locates the source of property owners’ obligations to their communities on the fact that all human 
beings are dependent throughout their lives on others to provide them in various ways with the 
means necessary to enable the development of certain indispensable capabilities. Even if one 
agrees, following the previous analysis, that communities are not confined to presently living 
persons, one may argue that, on the theory’s own premises, property owners cannot owe 
obligations to members of future generations because the living are not dependent upon unborn 
persons. This is a powerful objection, and it requires careful consideration. 
 
A. Looking Back: Obligations to Past Generations 
 
 Before looking forward, we must first look back. That is, we need first to discuss 
obligations that the present generation owes to past generations and the basis for such 
obligations. Much has already been written on this topic,36 but what matters for my purposes is 
the role of dependence in establishing obligations between members of different generations. 
The basis for skepticism that such an obligation exists is the very fact that members of past 
generations are dead. Because they are gone, the skeptic argues, nothing that we do or do not do 
today can possibly make their lives go any better or worse. The response to this objection that I 
shall make will pave the way for the case for obligations that we owe to future generations. 
 
 The skeptic’s argument that living persons can do nothing to affect the lives of those who 
are dead ultimately rests on the assumption that obligations must be based on avoidance of 
harm.37 Whether the dead can be harmed is a matter of considerable debate in the philosophical 
literature,38 but we need not resolve that debate to conclude that the present generation does owe 
obligations to the past. There is another basis for such obligations, an alternative to the harm 
principle. That basis is what we can call life-transcending projects. People have interests is 
having life-transcending projects carried through and realized after they deaths, sometimes many 
years after their deaths, but obviously they cannot do so themselves. They are dependent upon 
the living to honor the interest that the dead have in seeing their life-transcending projects 
continued and realized beyond the death of their creators.  
 
 Life-transcending projects are those projects the personal value or importance of which 
transcend creators or originators of the projects personally and so to transcend their lifetimes. 
Such projects vary widely. They range from personal projects, such as businesses that people 
                                                            
36 See, e.g., THOMAS SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER (Cambridge, MA, 1998); George Pitcher, The 
Misfortunes of the Dead, 21 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY 183 (1984). 
37 See JANNA THOMPSON, INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE: RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN AN INTERGENERATIONAL 
POLITY 56 (New York, 2009). 
38 See, e.g., Joan C. Callahan, On Harming the Dead, 97 ETHICS 341 (1987); Pitcher, The Misfortunes of the Dead, 
supra; Joel Feinberg, The Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations, in W.T. Blackstone ed., PHILOSOPHY AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS 4 (Athens, GA, 1974).  
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have created, to public-minded projects, such as charitable foundations. Nor are life-transcending 
projects limited to material affairs of these sorts. They may be as abstract as ideas or theories that 
a person has developed and to which she has devoted a great deal of effort and time. There are 
many obvious examples of life-transcending projects, including important private institutions 
including universities (e.g., Stanford, Cornell, The University of Chicago), museums (e.g., the 
Barnes Museum, the Guggenheim Museum); foundations (e.g., the Ford Foundation, the 
Carnegie Foundation); private hospitals, and so on.  
 
 Other examples are less obvious. For example, wealthy individuals commonly create 
charitable trusts in their wills, and these charitable trusts typically involve life-transcending 
projects. Charitable trust donors usually impose restrictions on what the trustees can do with the 
trust funds, and these restrictions represent attempts to assure that future trustees fulfill the 
donor’s life-transcending project. Sometimes these restrictions become impossible or 
impracticable to implement, and the law must modify the terms of the trust instrument so that the 
trust can operate on terms as close as possible to the donor’s original intent.39  At other times, 
however, the donor’s restrictions are so extreme or become irreconcilable with evolving public 
policy that courts are no longer willing to carry out the donor’s project as originally intended. (A 
racially discriminatory trust is an example.40) When that occurs, the court must decide whether 
the donor’s project was so intimately tied to the offensive feature that he would not want to go 
forward without it. If that is the case, then the court must refuse to carry out the trust. But if the 
court concludes that in its judgment the offensive feature was not indispensable to the donor’s 
project, then the court will revise the terms of the project to remove the offending feature and go 
forward with it.  
 
B. The Dead Hand Problem 
 
 Restrictions that now-deceased creators of life-transcending projects sometimes impose 
on later generation beneficiaries of these projects may pose difficult questions concerning the 
obligations of the living generation when asked to implement the terms of the project. For 
example, when creators of life-transcending projects transfer their projects to later generation 
beneficiaries in trusts, they sometimes do so through family trusts that extend the duration of 
trust for very long periods of time, over many generations of future beneficiaries who are given 
only limited property interests in the projects. The creator’s objective is to control the project for 
many generations after his death. This creates a problem known to common-law lawyers as the 
“dead-hand” problem.41 Anglo-American law places limits on these dead-hand trusts, albeit 
indirectly, through various rules, including the infamous Rule Against Perpetuities.42 Other 
problematic creator-imposed restrictions in trusts include prohibitions on the sale of an asset that 
the creator originally transferred into the trust and which later declines in value, thereby 
threatening the interests of the beneficiaries. Commonly, the assets in question are life-
transcending projects, such as a business that the creator personally started and developed. 
                                                            
39 This is known as the cy pres doctrine (cy pres is short for cy pres comme possible, a phrase taken from old Law 
French, meaning “as nearly as possible”). It is well-established in the common law. See, e.g., UNIFORM TRUST CODE 
§413; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §67. 
40 See, e.g.,  
41 See 
42  
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 A good example of this problem is the case of Joseph Pulitzer’s will.43 Pulitzer, after 
whom the top American annual prizes for journalism is named,44 left a will that gave to his 
trustees the large majority of shares of stock in a publishing company that he owned and created, 
the Press Publishing Company. This firm published several newspapers, including the now-
defunct New York World, to which Pulitzer was particularly devoted. The trust was for the 
benefit of his sons. Pulitzer’s will expressly withheld from the trustees the power to sell the Press 
Publishing Company stock “under any circumstances whatever . . . .”45 The will went on to give 
Pulitzer’s reasons, reflecting the fact that the Press Publishing Company was his life-
transcending project: 
 
 I particularly enjoin upon my sons and my descendants the duty of preserving, perfecting and 
 perpetuating “The World” newspaper (to the maintenance and upbringing of which I have 
 sacrificed my health and strength) in the same spirit which I have striven to create and conduct it 
 as a public institution, from motives higher than mere gain, it having been my desire that it should 
 be at all times conducted in a spirit of independence and with a view to inculcating high standards 
 and public spirit among the people and their official representatives, and it is my earnest wish that 
 said newspaper shall hereafter be conducted upon the same principles.46 
 
 Some years after Pulitzer’s death, readership of the World newspaper steadily eroded, 
causing the value of the Press Publishing Company stock to substantially decline. The trustees 
sought judicial approval to sell the stock on the ground that the unanticipated changes of 
circumstances threatened to defeat the purpose of the trust, which, they argued, was the benefit 
of Pulitzer’s sons. The court agreed, holding that it had the inherent power to respond to 
emergency circumstances that threatened total destruction of the trust asset. Regarding the will’s 
language that the stock not be sold under any circumstances, the court stated, “A man of 
[Pulitzer’s] sagacity and business ability could not have intended that from mere vanity, the 
publication of newspapers, with which his name and efforts had been associated, should be 
persisted in until the entire trust asset was destroyed or wrecked by bankruptcy or dissolution.”47 
 
 John Langbein has posed the challenging question, “Suppose . . . that the settlor in 
Pulitzer had foreseen and recited in the trust instrument the danger that the newspaper might 
become unprofitable, and he directed the trustees to continue operating it anyhow.” Langbein 
points out, “Such a restriction would not have been enforceable.”48 He goes on the explain, 
“Attempting to prevent the court from modifying the trust in response to such materially 
worsened circumstances would offend the anti-dead-hand principle embodied in the rule that the 
trust must be for the benefit of the beneficiaries.”49 The “benefit-the-beneficiaries” rule to which 
Langbein refers expresses the public policy that once a person has placed property in trust for the 
benefit of third parties, their benefit must override any personal motive that the creator may have 
                                                            
43 Matter of Pulitzer, 249 N.Y.S. 87 (Sur. Ct. 1931), aff’d mem., 260 N.Y.S. 975 (App. Div. 1932). 
44 See 
45 249 N.Y.S. at 92. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Id. at 94. 
48 John H. Langbein, Mandatory Rule in the Law of Trusts, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1105, 1118 (2004) (footnote omitted). 
49 Id. at 1118-19 (footnote omitted).  
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had regarding the continuing use of the property that is fundamentally incompatible with the 
beneficiaries’ interests.50  
 
 The New York World newspaper was a life-transcending project of Joseph Pulitzer, as his 
restriction so vividly manifests.  The case is a good illustration of both the fact that there must be 
limits on the obligations, especially legal obligations, that the living owe to the dead to 
implement life-transcending projects of the dead, however fundamental they may have been, and 
some of the reasons why such limits must exist. 
 
 The dead hand problem creates a risk of undermining the communal character of 
intergenerational relations. Past generations may not only impose restrictions of the sort I have 
just described, but they may refuse to transfer important assets to future generations of family 
members altogether. For example, Joseph Pulitzer may have chosen to leave his newspaper 
businesses to a business associate rather than to his sons. This undermines the dependency 
between generations and inhibits future generations from working within the framework 
necessary for communal relations between the generations. The role of future generations is, 
after all, to participate in the life-transcending projects of past generations, enhance them, and 
enable them to be carried forward into the future. If members of past generations exercise their 
control over those projects by refusing to transmit them within the family, broadly defined, then 
this role will be frustrated.  
 
 There is no obvious or easy way to avoid this risk. It is a consequence of a legal system 
that prefers the freedom of past owners over that the interests of the living. American law 
imposes no restrictions upon the ability of testators to leave their property at death to whomever 
they wish, disinheriting any members of their family except the surviving spouse.51 We must 
work within whatever limits the existing legal system creates. Nevertheless, reasons of self-
interest suggest that this risk is not great. Creators of life-transcending projects usually trust their 
children and grandchildren more than non-family members to carry through with their projects. 
After all, in most cases the creator’s children have been with the project since its inception and 
are more aware than most people of its important to their parent. The parent may even have 
groomed the children or grandchildren to take over care and management of the project at the 
appropriate time in the future. This is by no means an invariable scenario. Parents sometimes do 
disinherit their children, but the incidence of this is sufficiently small that the risk of this aspect 
of the dead hand problem is not great. 
 
C. Are Intended Transferees Obligated to Accept Life-Transcending Projects? 
 
 Do the transferees of life-transcending projects owe obligations to past-generation 
creators to accept the projects and carry through with them, or are they free to refuse to accept 
the projects? Normally, of course, the law of gifts provides that intended donees are free to 
                                                            
50 See UNIFORM TRUST CODE §404, 105(b)(3); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §27(2). 
51 American states have statutes, called elective share statutes, that protect a surviving spouse from disinheritance. 
The statutes vary in their details, but typically give the surviving spouse a non-barrable share of 1/3 of the 
decedent’s estate. See THOMAS P. GALLANIS, FAMILY PROPERTY LAW: WILLS, TRUSTS, AND FUTURE INTERESTS 
349-353 (New York, 2011). 
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refuse gifts ─ acceptance is a requirement for completion of a donative transfer.52 But is there a 
moral obligation here? There may, after all, be different considerations when asking whether a 
legal or moral obligation exists to the past generation.  
 
 There really are two separate questions here: first, whether the intended transferee is free 
to refuse the transfer entirely or instead must accept the life-transcending project; second, 
whether, if the transferee accepts the project, she is free to possess, use, or enjoy that project in 
whatever way she sees fit, regardless of the creator’s original purpose or intent. With respect to 
the first question, autonomy considerations loom large, but they do so as to both sides. 
Inevitably, someone’s autonomy interest must be sacrificed ─ that is precisely the rub of the 
dead hand dilemma.  
 
 I suggested earlier that human dependence upon others and upon the various means that 
nurture the capacities that enable us to flourish creates for us a moral obligation to support these 
nurturing means. Does this general principle apply in this situation such that intended recipients 
are morally obligated to accept transfers of life-transcending projects? There are two possible 
arguments. One is that living persons owe obligation to past generations, growing out of the 
former’s dependence, as a result of the past generations’ endowments of various resources that 
support the capabilities necessary for human flourishing. On this view, there is no necessary 
connection between nurturing of the necessary capabilities and the life-transcending project in 
question. It is the general endowment of various resources upon which living persons are 
dependent that furnishes the basis for the obligation. This connection seems too strained, too 
remote, to justify imposition of an obligation on living persons to accept an unwanted project, 
whatever it is. Although autonomy is not a paramount value in the human flourishing theory, it is 
nevertheless relevant to that theory. Under the circumstance posed, autonomy strongly counsel 
against forcing any transfer between private actors. Regardless of the intended recipient’s 
reasons, she should be free to reject a gift of any item, including a life-transcending project.   
 
 A weaker version of the argument holds that an obligation exists where the life-
transcending project itself is a means that nurtures necessary human capabilities. In such a case 
what was lacking in the previous discussion ─ a strong fit between the project itself and the 
dependency that is the predicate for obligations ─ is present, providing the foundation for a 
moral obligation to accept the transfer of the life-transcending project. Of course, not every life-
transcending project serves as a means for nurture the necessary capabilities. Some such projects 
will not be of that sort. The obligation should be limited just to those instances in which the life-
transcending project in question can plausibly be taken to be a means that nurtures, in some 
significant, or at least non-trivial way, the capabilities necessary for human flourishing. For 
many such life-transcending projects intended transferees will have self-interested reasons to 
accept the project voluntarily, but some people nevertheless have their own reasons to prefer 
rejecting the project. In such cases autonomy considerations weigh against forcing an unwanted 
gift upon the intended transferee. 
 Different considerations come into play where the living transferee has voluntarily 
accepted the life-transcending project but wishes to possess, use, or enjoy the project free of any 
further obligation to the past creator. Certainly if the life-transcending project itself is a means 
that nurtures necessary human capabilities, the same reasoning suggested above applies even 
                                                            
52 See RICHARD HYLAND, GIFTS: A STUDY IN COMPARATIVE LAW 484, 493 (New York, 2009). 
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more strongly, and the recipient should be obligated to follow through with the creator’s wishes. 
Even if there is no dependence upon the life-transcending project, however, obligations to make 
reasonable efforts to realize the creator’s wishes attach. What efforts are reasonable will vary 
depending upon the context, but one factor that will carry considerable weight in the 
reasonableness calculus is time. The further removed in time the recipient is from the creator, the 
weaker the obligation becomes. This is not only because it becomes more difficult to determine 
exactly what the creator’s wishes were but also because circumstances are likely to change as 
more time passes, creating the need to weaken the recipient’s obligations to the dead. American 
trust law, even while requiring that the original donor’s intent be respected, recognizes the need 
to build flexibility into the trust arrangement to accommodate future changes in circumstances. 
For charitable trusts, the cy-pres (“as near as possible”) doctrine permits courts to revise the 
terms of trusts where changed circumstances have made it impossible or impracticable to fulfill 
the donor’s original plans.53 For private trusts, the deviation doctrine permits courts to modify 
the terms of a trust where unanticipated changes of circumstances put the trust’s well-being in 
jeopardy.54 Similar considerations apply with respect to moral obligations owed to past 
generations. 
 
 
D. Looking Forward: Obligations to Future Generations 
 
 Let us now reverse direction and look forward. Having concluded that members of the 
living generation owe duties, moral and at times legal, to honor and carry out certain life-
transcending projects of the dead, does it necessarily follow that the same holds true of the 
relationship between those who are now living and the unborn? After all, the relationship 
between present and future generations can be seen as just the mirror image of that between the 
present and the past: living people are the future dead, and unborns are the future living.  
 
 There is, of course, a dependency relationship between present and future generations. 
But that relationship, seemingly, is asymmetrical ─ our children and grandchildren are dependent 
upon us, but the not the other way around. Future generations depend upon us for many things, 
not the least of which is their existence. But existence, though hardly inconsequential, is hardly 
the sole matter that is the source of their dependence upon us. Clean environment, basic 
infrastructure, a workable public system of government ─ all this and more are matters that 
future generations depend for their flourishing on their ancestors to inherit as their starting point. 
Of course, future generations may create these conditions themselves in the absence of such an 
inheritance, as some societies have indeed done, but in that case they create their own flourishing 
rather than depend upon their ancestors to pass on to them the basic conditions of social 
flourishing.  
 
 If our children and their descendants depend upon us for certain basic conditions 
necessary for their flourishing, seemingly we are not dependent on them for our flourishing. The 
unborn cannot provide us with any material goods, such as a clean environment or infrastructure, 
comparable to what we transmit to them.  
 
                                                            
53 See UNIFORM TRUST CODE §413. 
54 See UNIFORM TRUST CODE §412. 
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 Although the dependency relationship between present and future generations appears to 
asymmetrical, in fact it is not. Living people depend upon future generations to carry through 
with the life-transcending projects that living persons begin during their lifetimes.  The 
dependency of the living upon future generations may take multiple forms, ranging from 
recognition of the project as something worth pursuing to execution and ongoing management of 
the project. Just as the dead cannot entirely realize their life-transcending projects themselves but 
must depend on the living to fulfill the dead’s interests, so it is also between the living and their 
successors. The very nature of life-transcending projects makes living persons dependent upon 
future generations to respect the project and continue its existence.  
 
 Living persons sometimes attempt to reduce the discretion of future generations to 
recognize and implement life-transcending projects through the same techniques discussed 
previously, notable legal arrangements that impose duties on the future donees to comply with 
specified restrictions. Arrangements like trusts are especially common among wealthier creators, 
whose life-transcending projects often are an important part of their estate portfolio.   
 
 Wealthy persons are not the only ones who have life-transcending projects the fulfillment 
of which require the help of future generations. Owners of small businesses and family farms 
usually hope that the enterprises to which they have devoted the better portion of their lives will 
continue to thrive after their deaths, and they depend on future generations to carry out their 
hopes and dreams. Inventors hope that their creations will continue to be used many years after 
their deaths. Authors hope that their works will continue to attract readers for decades, even 
centuries to come. Scholars hope that future scholars will use their work, and so on.  
 
 Even those whose lives have seemingly not been devoted to creative enterprises have 
their own life-transcending projects. The protection and care of family heirlooms, even though 
with modest or slight market value, is often a matter of great concern to ordinary people, 
including people of limited wealth. They pass on to their children and grandchildren objects that 
they themselves received from their ancestors as tokens of memory, family continuity, and love, 
and they depend on their children and grandchildren to care for these emotionally-weighted 
objects and to pass them on when their turn comes. Not only heirlooms but other objects, 
seemingly minor, often are items of life-transcending projects. Hobbies, for example, are very 
important to many people, so important that they lead to life-transcending projects. Consider 
collections, such as stamps, coins, figurines, and the like. Collectors commonly are passionate 
about their collections, and they pass them on to others at their death in the hope that future 
owners will recognize the project’s significance and survive rather than simply being tossed 
away as if it were nothing more than yesterday’s newspapers. Creative hobbies such as painting, 
knitting, potting, and so on, also come to take on life-transcending status for many people. The 
results of these activities, what this type of hobbyists produces, are equally if not more weighted 
with self-expression and personal identity than collections. It would be surprising if even the 
most modestly talented amateur artist or woodworker is indifferent to destiny of her or his 
creation. Even as a matter of pure self-interest, creators care about the future of their creations. 
They do not as a matter of transcending their own self-interest or personal values, but because 
their self-interest is inextricably tied to the fate to what they have created. Creators of all sorts do 
not value their creations solely for the enjoyment that they give the creators during their 
lifetimes. Creations have deeper value that that. In a very real sense, such creations, even those 
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limited in achievement or talent, represent a form of immortality for their creators. What such 
projects transcend, then, is not self-interest but time. But the immorality that the creators of such 
projects seek for their creations requires the cooperation of future generations. The creators 
cannot realize time-transcendent value of their projects by themselves; they are dependent on 
others ─ future generations ─ to do so.   
 
V. THE SUBSTANTIVE CONTENT OF OBLIGATIONS TO FUTURE AND PAST GENERATIONAL 
COMMUNITIES 
 
 Assuming, at least provisionally, that intergenerational communities exist (i.e., that such 
a concept is meaningful) and that members of such communities owe each other duties, just what 
are those duties, and, equally important, what are the limits of those duties? These duties are 
moral duties, although conceivably they might have legal implications. My main concern here is 
with the moral duties, although I shall have some comments regarding possible legal aspects. 
 
 More important for my purposes than the distinction between moral and legal duties is 
the distinction between the obligations that living generational members owe to their immediate 
future counterparts ─ i.e., those who are, say, two generations removed from them, on the one 
hand, and on the other, the obligations that they owe to more remote future counterparts. As we 
will see, the two perspectives raise different considerations.  
 
A. The Obligations Owed to (Relatively) Immediate Future Generational Communities 
 
 There are two possible bases for obligations owed to future generational communities, 
contract, including implied understandings, and dependency. Although it is possible that in 
particular cases they will overlap, it is important to treat them separately, for they the content of 
moral obligations that each may justify is likely to differ. 
 
1. Dependency-Based Obligations 
 
 The starting point for thinking about what moral obligations we owe to future generation 
communities is the very factor that is the foundation for the general claim that past, present, and 
future generational communities may owe each other obligations ─ dependency. What we 
minimally owe, as a moral matter, to both deceased and unborn members of the various 
communities that nurture the capabilities necessary for our flourishing derives from our and their 
dependency on each other. Specifically, the content of our and their obligations must relate to 
their and our life-transcending projects and the fact that the fulfillment of those projects are 
dependent upon the cooperation of others who come after us.  
 
 Those life-transcending projects and our dependency of future generations for the 
realization of such projects provide the reference point for our moral obligations to future 
generation communities. But that reference point is beguilingly robust. It means, or might be 
taken to mean, that our obligations include providing the background infrastructure that is 
necessary for any such project’s continuation or realization. This background infrastructure 
would include, for example, a clean (or reasonably so) environment ─ air, water, and so on ─ 
that future generational communities will inhabit and in which they will work. Lacking such an 
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environment, they simply will be unable to carry through with any life-transcending projects, 
including their own. As Joel Feinberg remarked, “[S]urely we owe it to future generations to 
pass on a world that is not a used up garbage heap.”55 The requisite background infrastructure 
will also include well-functioning transportation and communication networks. It will further 
include a health-care system whose quality equals or exceeds that of the present generation.  
 
 All of these background conditions ─ a reasonably clean environment, well-functioning 
transportation and communication networks, a minimally acceptable (both in terms of quality 
and distribution of health-care services) health-care system ─ are circumstances that those in 
present-day generation communities take for granted. If, then, those present-day community 
members expect, or at least hope, that their fellow community members in future generations 
will continue the life-transcending projects that the living members began, it is incumbent on 
them to provide the same background conditions that they enjoyed to those future community 
members to whom they transfer the responsibility of continuing or fulfilling their life-
transcending projects. That obligation should apply to the extent that such background conditions 
are reasonably necessary or facilitative for the implementation of the relevant projects. This is a 
basis upon which we can explain Brian Barry’s equal-opportunity maxim: “The overall range of 
opportunities open to successor generations should not be narrowed.”56 
 
 The obligation to provide the same background conditions that living community 
members enjoy to those future community members to whom they transfer the responsibility of 
continuing or fulfilling their life-transcending projects is foundational and general. It serves as a 
broad basis upon which the pursuit of life-transcending projects can be conducted, a necessary 
but not always sufficient for such projects to continue beyond the lives of their creators. 
 
 Beyond this minimal obligation,57 what further obligations living community members 
owe to future generation members will depend on the project that living members pass on to their 
future co-members. Additional obligations must be reasonably connected to the particular life-
transcending projects in the sense that the obligations are reasonably necessary for the project’s 
                                                            
55 Joel Feinberg, The Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations, in Blackstone, PHILOSOPHY AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
CRISIS, supra at p. 598. 
56 Brian Barry, Circumstances of Justice and Future Generations, in R.I. Sikora and Brian Barry, eds., OBLIGATIONS 
TO FUTURE GENERATIONS (Philadelphia, 1978), p. 242. 
57 Regarding the legal dimension of this minimal general obligation, the question is should members of future 
generation communities have positive legal rights to such background conditions. If they do have such rights, 
against whom would those rights be enforceable, at what time(s) and by whom? The question of the timing of 
enforcement comes up because if the rights are enforcement only when the future generation members come into 
existence, then it is possible that the duty-bearers may no longer be available. The timing issue relates to the 
question of the identity of the duty-bearer, or at least the identity of the party against whom the right is enforceable. 
Specifically, are such positive rights enforceable against the state, acting as the agent or representative of 
community members who are the real duty-holder? Further questions exist. These positive rights, like all positive 
rights, pose problems concerning the exact scope of the right: May the rights-holders demand that the duty-holder(s) 
take any and all steps necessary to provide a clean environment, etc., or is it sufficient if the duty-holder puts into 
place a reasonable policy or program designed to achieve a clean environment, etc., given the financial and other 
constraints under which the duty-holder is acting? It is worth noting that the latter is the approach that countries like 
the Republic of South Africa have taken in interpreting the positive socio-economic rights provisions of their 
constitutions. See Grootboom. 
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continued existence or fulfillment. We may think of these specific obligations as endowments 
that support the life-transcending projects.  
 
 What might such endowments include? It depends, of course. Suppose, for example, that 
the life-transcending project that a current generation community member wishes her/his future 
community members to continue and advance to the extent possible is a business that the current 
member created. S/he legally transfers the business to her/his descendants at death, enjoining 
them to continue and grow the business. Should the business creator be morally obligated to 
transfer to the recipients of the business with any additional resources by way of an endowment 
to carry out that project? Of course, it is possible that there has been some agreement or 
understanding between the transferor and the recipients, as we will see, and in that case the 
agreement should normally control the parties’ obligations.  
 
 But suppose there is no such understanding. Does the transferor owe the transferees of 
her/his business an obligation to provide any sort of endowment to support that business? This is 
not an easy question to answer, especially given the transferor’s explicit injunction to the 
transferees to continue and advance the business to the extent possible. Initially, we have to 
suppose that the transferees accept the transfer, for donees are free, at least legally, to reject 
attempted gratuitous transfers, both lifetime and at death.58 Assuming that the transferees accept 
the bequest and assuming further that the testator’s injunction is merely precatory and creates no 
legal obligation, it may nevertheless create a moral obligation on the transferees, who, after all, 
accepted the business knowing of the testator’s injunction to them and its likely importance to 
her/him. If such a moral obligation exists, a strong argument can be made that the testator should 
provide the transferees with some sort of additional endowment to the extent that additional 
resources are necessary to enable the transferees to fulfill their moral obligation to the testator. If 
additional resources are needed to allow the transferee to carry out the testator’s injunction and 
the testator provides no further support, the transferees must deplete their own resources to do so. 
Of course, they could simply reject the bequest, but would present them with a Hobson’s Choice: 
either accept the bequest with the consequence that they must deplete their own resources to 
fulfill their moral obligation to the testator, or reject the bequest entirely (which has the 
undesirable side effect of frustrating the testator’s life-transcending interest). Fairness seems to 
suggest reciprocity of moral obligations here. The moral obligation on the transferees to fulfill, to 
the extent reasonably possible, the testator’s injunction should they choose to accept the bequest 
should be matched by a moral obligation on the testator to provide such resources as are 
reasonably necessary to allow the transferees to fulfill their obligation to the transferee, should 
they choose to accept the bequest. This approach maximizes the likelihood that the testator’s 
wishes, particularly the continuation of her/his life-transcending project, will be carried out and 
at the same time achieves fairness between the testator and the transferees. 
 
2. Contract-Based Obligations 
 
 I have indicated that the moral obligations we owe to future generation communities 
derive from the dependent nature of the relationship between them. But the obligation might 
alternatively be grounded in contract. Where an agreement, explicit or implicit, existed between 
                                                            
58 See JESSE DUKEMINIER, ROBERT SITKOFF, and JAMES LINDGREN, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES (New York, 
2009), p. 152. 
 19 
 
the transferor of the life-transcending project and the recipients, the presumption should be that 
the agreement, assuming that it can be satisfactorily proved, creates an obligation, both moral 
and legal, in the recipients. This is simply a matter of basic contract principles. The real question 
is whether there ought to be any limits on the scope of that moral obligation. Plainly, there are 
some limits, both as a matter of law and morality, to freedom of contract. Terms, conditions, or 
restrictions that creator-donors place on transfers that violate public policy do not and should not 
create obligations, moral or legal, on beneficiaries of such transfers. Transfers subject to racially-
restrictive conditions, to pick an obvious example, impose no enforceable obligations on 
beneficiaries even where the beneficiaries had previously agreed to such terms. The autonomy 
interests of the donor and the beneficiaries should not trump the larger stakes that society has in 
assuring that no group of its citizen is subordinated, dominated, or rendered unable to fully 
participate in the society’s ongoing affairs, private as well as public. 
 
 Beyond terms or conditions of that sort, the question becomes more difficult to evaluate. 
Suppose, for example, that a testator bequeaths her business to her children with the 
understanding that the children continue to operate the business in exactly the same way that the 
testator had; i.e., for precisely the same business functions, with no expansion or other change in 
scope of business, no diversification of type of business, place of doing business, etc. Suppose 
further that some years later, the business’s future is in jeopardy because the market for the 
firm’s product had all but disappeared. The firm’s current owners, the beneficiaries of the 
bequest of the firm’s creator, want to save the business by diversifying its product line, but doing 
would clearly contradict the terms of the bequest. Would diversifying the firm’s product line to 
save the family business breach an obligation, legal or moral, that the current owners owe to the 
past owner (all of whom are members of the same  generational community)? From a legal 
perspective, it is unclear whether such an obligation exists. Normally, the law of donative 
transfers gives maximum effect to the transferor's wishes, but this only the baseline. There is an 
exception for public policy, of course, just as there is a public policy exception for the 
enforceability of agreements. For example, restraints that testator’s impose on a beneficiary’s 
personal conduct may be unenforceable on public policy grounds. Here, the restriction is on 
business conduct rather than personal conduct. Different policy considerations are involved 
where the restriction is on business conduct rather than on personal affairs such as the 
beneficiary’s right to marry, especially here where an agreement between the transferor and the 
beneficiaries apparently exists. No personal rights of the beneficiaries are at stake, only the well-
being of the business firm. Given the law’s reluctance to interfere with freedom of disposition, it 
is quite possible, indeed likely, that the answer to the legal question is that a legal obligation on 
the beneficiaries to comply with the transferor’s conditions exists, even at the risk of the firm 
dissolving into bankruptcy in the future.  
 
 As a moral matter, there is little reason to reach a different conclusion. Although 
somewhat different considerations come to bear when we move from the legal to the moral 
sphere, the matter does not change fundamentally. The principles of freedom of disposition and 
freedom of contract have a moral as well dimension, and there are no overriding moral 
considerations that weigh in favor of relieving the beneficiaries of an obligation that they 
voluntarily assumed, even at the expense of the firm’s future. Perhaps they regret doing so now 
(as in all likelihood they do), but regret alone surely in not adequate moral grounds for relieving 
someone of a moral obligation that they voluntarily assumed. 
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B. The Obligations Owed to More Remote Future Generational Communities 
  
 Thus far, the future generational communities that I have considered have all been 
immediate descendant generations ─ the generations of children and grandchildren of creators of 
life-transcending projects. The more difficult aspect of the general problem of future 
generational communities involves more remote generations. Such generations pose more 
difficult questions because project creators cannot expect to share a common life with such 
persons, at least not in any literal sense.59 The problem is not simply that project creators will not 
know persons who are more than three generations removed from them (or vice versa) but, more 
fundamentally, that little connects living persons to such remote future generations other than the 
most basic sorts of commonalities, notably genetic ties and perhaps family names. Even those 
ties become more attenuated with each generation removed.  
 
 Given that increasing attenuation, one may question whether such remote future 
generations are members of the same generational communities as the living at all. I previously 
indicated that community members share understandings of whom and what they are, and one 
might suppose that the attenuation of ties between present and remotely future generation means 
that such shared understandings will be lacking. At the same time, I indicated, echoing Avner de-
Shalit,60 that part of what constitutes communities is cultural interaction61 and that cultural 
interaction includes shared traditions, which may involve “historically extended, socially 
embodied argument[s].”62 As Alastair MacIntyre observed, such arguments and such traditions 
may extend through many generations.63  
 
 Assuming that the creator’s generational community includes remote future generations, 
the question then becomes whether the same obligations that are owed to relatively near 
generations also are owed to remote future generations. Some years ago, Martin Golding argued 
that our obligations to future generations ought to be confined to our “immediate posterity”64 
because we cannot know what is good for them. We do not know what the condition of their 
lives will be or even whether they share with us the same conception of the good life for human 
beings.65 We would be well-advised, then, Golding, simply not to plan for remote future 
generations.  
 
 Conceding Golding’s points regarding the lack of information about the specific 
condition of the lives of remote future generation members and their conception of the good life, 
it does not follow that the living owe them no moral obligations whatsoever. The same problem 
may exist for some living persons who are members of cultures that are far removed from and 
quite alien to ours, but that fact does not warrant the conclusion that we owe no moral 
                                                            
59 See Martin P. Golding, Obligation to Future Generations, in Ernest Partridge ed., RESPONSIBILITIES TO FUTURE 
GENERATIONS 61, 61-62 (Buffalo, NY, 1981). 
60 See DE-SHALIT, WHY POSTERITY MATTERS, supra.  
61 See page 4 supra. 
62 MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra, p. 222. 
63 Ibid. 
64 See Golding, Obligation to Future Generations, supra, p. 70. 
65 Ibid. 
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obligations to them. We owe such persons moral obligations by virtue of their humanity. 
Regardless of the specific conditions of their existence, members of remote future generations 
share with us certain basic features that are inherent in the human condition ─ the abilities to 
love and to enjoy; vulnerability to pain, suffering, and ultimately, death; self-consciousness; and 
so on.66 Given these fundamental commonalities, the moral norms of equality and human dignity 
suggest that, although differences may exist between the moral obligations that we owe members 
of immediate future generational communities and their remote counterparts, we owe members 
of our remote future generational communities at least minimal moral obligations.  
 
 Nevertheless, our lack of information about remote future generational communities and 
their attenuated relationship to the living do have a bearing upon the content of our obligations to 
them. Golding’s point that we cannot plan for such persons seems correct as far as it goes. The 
obligations that living creators of life-transcending projects owe to remote future generational 
community members must be of a more basic sort. The obligations should be aimed at 
constituting a framework within which members of remote future generational communities who 
wish to continue life-transcending projects transmitted to them may do so, a background that 
enables such individuals to pursue these projects, if they so choose. This background condition 
consists of certain of the fundamental capabilities discussed in Part I, among these the 
capabilities of health, personal security, and freedom.  
 
 A more concrete statement this background must take into account the possible effects, 
allocative but especially distributive, of norms that would affirmatively seek to assure that 
resources are available to remote future generations. This is, of course, a familiar problem in 
discussions on intergenerational justice.67 The problem is complex, for it involves two uncertain 
variables, first, increasing scarcity of resources over the future, and second, the contingency of 
future generational communities. This is not the proper occasion for anything like a full analysis 
of the distributive problem, but a few comments on these two variables will indicate why caution 
is appropriate is mapping out a specific account of the background condition. 
 
 With regard to future scarcity, the dilemma posed by uncertainty is this: Whether 
economic growth can be sustained in a finite natural world is one of the most persistent questions 
in economic literature. The unprecedented rate of consumption of natural resources and the 
concomitant effects have given rise to acute concern with sustainability, a term that has come to 
be closely associated with intergenerational justice in the relevant literatures. Because the growth 
in the rate of consumption has been exponential, the fear is that relevant consumption rates at 
some future point will swamp production rates, leading to potentially catastrophic results.  
 
 But this scenario is far from certain. We cannot categorically exclude the possibility that 
human creativity will ameliorate increased scarcity. After all, in the past, humans have proved to 
be quite adept at finding solutions to the problem of scarce natural resources. Repeatedly, they 
have developed new technologies that economize on scarce natural resources or that allow the 
                                                            
66 See Gregory Kavka, The Futurity Problem, in Partridge, RESPONSIBILITIES TO FUTURE GENERATIONS, supra, at 
109, 112-113. 
67 See, e.g., ibid; Daniel Callahan, What Obligations Do We Have to Future Generations?, in Partridge, 
RESPONSIBILITIES TO FUTURE GENERATIONS, supra, at 73. 
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use of resources that were previously uneconomical. There is no obvious reason to think that this 
pattern will not continue, allowing us not merely to avoid passing on to remote future 
generations a greatly degraded and depleted environment but to transmit a set of conditions that 
is at least as good as what we currently enjoy (thereby satisfying a future generational 
counterpart to the Lockean proviso68).  
 
 Which scenario will transpire? We cannot know, of course, and that is precisely the 
problem. For if we are to develop anything like a concrete account of the background condition 
that we owe to members of our remote future generational communities, we must have some idea 
of what the probable state of resources available to such future persons is. In the absence of that 
basic information, we simply cannot specify our obligation in any sort detail. 
 
 The second variable of uncertainty is the contingency of future generations. This 
contingency is not simply a matter of when but of whether ─ members of our future generational 
communities may not exist at all. Their existence depends, to a considerable extent, upon 
decisions that living members make. How does this existential uncertainty affect the moral 
obligations that living community members owe to potential members in the future? Gregory 
Kavka poses a useful analogy.69 Imagine, he suggests, a poor couple that has some children and 
is contemplating have more. The question is whether they should treat the prospective children 
are being on a par with their living children with respect to the consumption of their resources, 
i.e., by conserving resources for unborn children. Kavka’s answer is that they should not if doing 
so would cause the living children to suffer serious deprivation.70 This answer seems to me to be 
the right one. The living have moral obligations to living members of their communities, and 
those obligations must be met first. This is not to say that the living owe no obligations to 
conserve resources for future generational members, including remote future generations. The 
point is one of priority ─ under conditions of scarcity, priority in the distribution of resources 
must be given to existing resource consumers. Moreover, the more remotely in the future the 
generational members are, the weaker the moral obligation that the living owe to them. 
 
C. The Contingency of Our Obligations to Unborn Communities 
 
 Grounding our obligations to future generational communities on a specific dependency 
between generations, i.e., the dependency of the living generation upon their future generational 
counterparts to carry on life-transcending projects, seemingly makes those obligations contingent 
in a way that other bases for such obligations do not.71 The apparent vulnerability of the 
obligations to future generations on this account results from an implied advance deal between 
the generational communities: The living will provide the future counterparts with a clean 
environment, a well-functioning infrastructure, a reasonable efficient economy, and minimally 
acceptable health-care system in exchange for future generations’ reasonable efforts to carry out 
the life-transcending projects of their forebears. This may be a troubling conclusion to some who 
think that our obligations to transfer such a material foundation to future generation should be 
unconditional and unconstrained. From one perspective, the dependency theory looks like a hold-
                                                            
68 See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, Peter Laslett ed. (Cambridge 1988). 
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71 I am grateful to Hanoch Dagan for raising this point. 
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up. More fundamentally, the theory seemingly encroaches upon future generations’ autonomy 
interest in creating their own lives and the conditions of those lives. 
 
 This concern, although understandable, does not, I think, fundamentally undermine the 
dependency theory. One reason is the diversity and protean character of life-transcending 
projects. That character minimizes the cost to future generations of carrying on with such 
projects. Indeed, in many, perhaps most cases the enterprise of carrying on with such projects is 
a benefit rather than a cost, and it is in the self-interest of future generation community members 
to do so. The upshot is that the aggregate of both life-transcending projects and future generation 
community members will likely yield precisely the background material conditions and 
structures that proponents of non-contingent obligations to future generations desire.  
 
 Of course, this scenario is not certain, and contingency still exists. But contingency is an 
inescapable aspect of the human condition. No one can guarantee future conditions of the world. 
There are too many variables over which we have little or no control. Weather conditions may 
change catastrophically for non-man-made reasons (as best as science can presently tell), 
globalization of financial markets may produce long-term economic depressions over which any 
single nation has little control, global changes in population and immigration (legal and illegal) 
─ all of these possible future scenarios may seriously affect the ability of any nation or even 
group of nations to transmit to future generations stable and decent material conditions and 
structures. All that the living can commit themselves to do for future generations is to make 
reasonable efforts, under whatever circumstances happen to prevail at the given time, to transmit 
decent minimal material conditions. Admittedly, that commitment is limited, and it leaves future 
generations with risks. But that is the most the living can promise the unborn. 
 
  
CONCLUSION 
 
 The living do owe moral obligations to unborn members of their communities, but those 
obligations are limited. They are limited in multiple ways, including the basis, or source, or the 
obligations, and the distance between the presently living members and unborn members. The 
basis of the obligations is rooted in the idea of what I have called life-transcending projects: the 
desire that living persons have in seeing that certain projects or interests of theirs be carried on 
after their deaths. This basis of the obligation helps define the range of persons, resources, and 
precise nature of the obligations. Moreover, the obligations that the living owe to future 
generational communities generally weaken as the distance between the living and the unborn 
increases. In an environment of uncertainty and scarce resources, our first and greatest moral 
obligation regarding the distribution of resources is to those members of our communities who 
are living with us and who continue to nurture the capabilities necessary for us to flourish. The 
second priority should be given to the future generational communities who come immediately 
after us, for the relevant ties between those generations usually will be relatively strong. The 
further out generational line stretches, the weaker our obligations become. 
